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A THEORY OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION:
PERU 1968-1980
by
LUIS J. BAIGORRIA PERA
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 23, 1983 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of City Planning
ABSTRACT
The military government that held power in Peru from 1968-
1980 made explicit that popular participation was one of
its main mid-term generic objectives and its espoused
theory.
Popular participation has been analyzed in four
areas: urban, rural, industrial, and state owned enter-
prises.
The theory in use that can be constructed from the
actual behavior proves that the military did not want
participation, but wanted to control the process of change
which was taking place in the country.
It can be concluded that manipulation can lead to
civil disorder, increase the number of strikes, reduce in-
vestment in the country, and raise false expectations
among citizens as to the real outcomes to be expected in
a participatory process.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Donald A. Scho5n
Title: Ford Professor, Department of Urban
Studies and Planning
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact
of participatory processes in the context of a society
undergoing drastic structural changes, specifically the
changes that occured in Peru from 1968 to 1980.
Popular mobilization started being promoted in Peru
in the 1920's when a generation of workers and middle class
landowners founded the APRA party. Even though the APRA
has not yet governed Peru through an elected President,
it has had a profound impact on shaping policies.
After World War II, a generation of LatinAmerican
intellectuals working with the United Nations in ECLA
developed the theory of dependence that proposed dramatic
changes in the relationships between Latin America and the
so-called 'Developed Countries'. It also suggested the
necessity of radical structural changes on the continent.
The Alliance for Progress, strongly supported by
President John F. Kennedy, legitimized these reforms and
recognized that they were a prerequisite for economic
development in Latin America.
The Acci6n Popular party, led by architect and
planner Fernando Belaunde Terry was seen as a young party
with new and strong ideas. Its name Accidn Popular
(Popular Action) was very descriptive: it meant that self-
help and popular participation were the core of their doc-
trine. President Belaunde, elected in 1963, launched an
aggressive campaign of development under the motto "El
Peru Construye" (Peru Builds).
The democratic government of President Belaunde
finished abruptly on October 3, 1968: a coup d'6tat led
by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, ousted President Belaunde
who found refuge in the United States where he taught for
several years at the Harvard School of Design.
The Peruvian Military, unlike their counterparts in
other Latinamerican countries, were committed to radical
reforms, redistributive policies and the wish for faster
economic development. They made it explicit that popular
participation was one of the government's main mid-term
generic objectives and its espoused theory.
Participation took place on several fronts:
- Rural participation
- Urban participation
- Participation in the industry
- Participation in state owned enterprises
The government organized institutions to promote popular
mobilization and participation, but when the country fell
into a deep recession as a result of the 1974 oil crisis
and internal problems, the Miilitary abandoned further
attempts of participation and took repressive measures
against the very same people whose mobilization they had
encouraged years earlier. The Military decided that their
institutions might suffer if they carried on with the task
of governing the country. A new constitution was written
by representatives democratically elected in 1979, and in
July 1980, Fernando belaunde was once again elected Presi-
dent, this time under the promise of creating one million
jobs, a sign of the economic crisis that was hitting the
country. Participation was not anymore an important part
on the agenda.
For the analysis, the main trends in participatory
literature will be discussed, the actors taking part in
the process will be examined, and hypotheses will be for-
mulated and tested in the context of the situation dis-
cussed in the previous chapters.
The espoused theory of participation will be dis-
cussed and compared with the theory in use constructed
from the the observation of the actual behavior.
After testing the hypotheses, the main predicaments
of the participatory process will be outlined.
CHRONOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION IN PERU
1821:Peru begins as a Republic
1861-1877: TheGuano Era- Construction of Railways
1879-1884t The Saltpeter War or 'Guerra del Pacifico' is
lost by Peru.
1924: The APRA party is founded by V.R. Haya de la Torre
1932: APRA rebellion against Dictator Sanchez Cerro is
violently suffocated. Beginning of a feud between
Mi li tary and APRA.
1945s F. Belaunde elected to Congress, begins public life
1948: Dicatator M.A. Odria takes power.APRA party banned.
1956: President Prado elected."Accidn Popular" Party is
founded by F. Belaunde with 'Participation' as motto.
1962: Elections won by APRA under V.R. Haya de La Torre
Military stage a coup d'dtat; APRA relegated.
1963: F.Eelaunde and Accid~n Popular win elections, but
APRA has majority in Congress.
1968: Gen. J.Velasco A. ousts Belaunde in a bloddless
coup. Participation is espoused theory of Revolu-
tionary Government as essential to development.
1975: Gen. F. Morales Bermddez C. stages a coup d'4tat
against Gen. Velasco. Participation becomes more
orthodox.
71979: Elections for 'Asamblea Constituyente' (to write
a more modern, updated constitution). APRA wins the
majority. Acci6n Popular (headed by Belaunde) does
not take part in this election out of their own will.
1980: Elections for President. Acci6n Popular wins with
F. Belaunde.
Chapter I
THE PRE-1968 ERA
1. The APRA party:
As a result of the loss of the 'Guerra del Facifi-
co' or Saltpeter War, the economic collapse of the north-
ern region of Peru could only be overcome with the attract-
tion of foreign capital and the joining of most of the
existing sugar plantations. This process was especially
intense between 1885 and 1890, and as a result, the sugar
plantations and haciendas of the colonial landed aristo-
cracy were swallowed by three major plantations: Casa-
grande, Roma, and Cartavio. Their owners were the Gilde-
meister, Larco, and Grace families who were a symbol of
foreign investment (German, Italian, and American re-
spectively) in the region.
World War I boomed sugar prices which rose 600%
from 1913 to 1920. Sugar exports fell from 12.5 million
sterling pounds in 1920 to 4 million sterling pounds in
1921. The Larco family was ruined, and Hacienda Roma was
bought by Casagrande. Hacienda Cartavio and Hacienda
Chiclin in the Chicama Valley were the only organizations
which Casagrande could not absorb.
As a consequence, large proportions of middle
class small landowners, impoverished merchants, and a
large proportion of workers were unhappy about the social
and economic state of affairs. A young university stu-
dent of San Marcos University, Victor Raul Haya de la
Torre, who belonged to one of the wealthy families of
Trujillo, the principal city in the north, rebelled open-
ly against the government of President Leguia in 1923,
and as a result was forced into exile. His was really the
first attempt made to mobilize people and make the govern-
ment aware of the feelings of the groups that did not
have material power, but were ready to voice their opin-
ions and protest against the situation.
While in Mexico, the country where he was exiled,
Haya de la Torre decided to take radical action and mobi-
lize people, making in fact the first attempt in a coun-
try that had been ruled in an authoritarian way from the
Incas to the Conquistadores, to their descendants, the
landed gentry, to make all people participate in the way
the country was run. In Mexico, he founded the APRA
party (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) with a
five point program in which, for the first time, the
issue of nationalizations was suggested:
1. Action against U.S. Imperialism
2. Political Union of Latin America
3. Nationalization of lands and industry
4. Internationalization of the Panama Canal
5. Solidarity with all the oppressed classes and peoples
of the world.
From 1926 to 1931, Haya de la Forre travelled and
studied in England (London School of Economics), Germany
(Berlin, Wirtschaftsinstitut Lateinamerikas) and the US,
and returned to Peru after President Leguia had been
overthrown by Lt. Col. Luis Sanchez Cerro on August 22,
1931. He had capitalized on the unhappiness of the people
as a consequence of the Depression.
After elections were held, the APRA got 35% of the
votes and 23 r.epresentatives in the Congress, but failed
to win the elections. The APRA leaders and the sugar
cane workers attacked the O'Donovan Fortress in Trujillo
on July 7, 1932 because in their opinion, they had been
cheated in the elections. They killed the Army officers
who were in charge of the fortress. Thorndike2 mentions
that the Army used airplanes in their counterattack and
had the APRA rebellion under control after four days.
Many workers and APRA leaders were shot in the Pre-Colum-
bian city of Chan-Chan, near Trujillo, and this incident
was the beginning of a never ending enmity between the
KlarenPeter F.:Formaci6n de las Haciendas Azucareras
y Origenes del APRA, Lima:IEP, 1970
2Thorndike, Guillermo: 1932, El Aio de la Barbarie,
Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1971
the APRA and the Army which would do anything to stop the
APRA leaders from controlling the country.
The APRA party had a strong influence in the shap-
ing of the Peruvian policies towards squatter settlements.
After a long period of underground activities, vividly
described by Thorndike 1 , the party came into power in
1945 under the name of "Frente Democritico Nacional"
(National Democratic Front). With it a period of intense
political mobilization started. Once in Congress, the
APRA used public money to strengthen the party organi-
zation. Many trade or labor unions were formed with the
help of the APRA at this stage. Unfortunately, it was
also a period of political violence which in January 1945
culminated with the assassination of Francisco Grafia,
editor of "La Prensa", a daily newspaper that had been
waging a strong campaign against the APRA. Grafia had be-
longed to a powerful family that until the land reform
in 1968 owned one of the largest haciendas of the coun-
try. The mentioned assassination put in the limelight two
men who were fervent enemies of the APRA and later be-
came came main figures in the shaping of squatter settle-
ments: Pedro Beltran, a conservative oligarch and land-
owner (educated at Cambridge University and holding a
I Ibid.
degree in economics) and Manuel Odria, an Army general of
humble highland origin, who later became President of
Peru. Beltran had been Peruvian ambassador to the United
States until Grafia's assassination upon which he was
appointed editor of "La Prensa" and continued the cam-
paign against the APRA. Odria was appointed Minister of
Government and tried to accomplish in Peru what Juan
Domingo Per6n and his wife Evita had been doing in Argen-
tine at the same period.
The APRA party and its radical outlook attracted
many people from the highlands to Lima, where the party
provided more opportunities. Collier suggests that the
Communist Party was also involved in this process. Al-
though the government tried to evict invaders, there is
clear evidence that Odria did not seriously try to get
the squatters out of the occupied lands. It seems that
Odria's intention was to get future support from the
squatters.
After a faction of the APRA unsuccessfully tried a
military coup with the help of the Navy in 1948, Presi-
dent Bustamante outlawed the APRA, and three weeks later
Odria organized a coup and managed to overthrow the go-
vernment. He got hold of power with the initial support
of the export oligarchy that was against some of the
David Collier:Squatters and Oligarchs.
The John Hopkins University Press, 1976
economic policies which Bustamante had put into effect and
which were against their interests. Also, the military
budget had been cut, and the Military therefore looked for
a chance to overthrow Bustamante and strengthen their
own position within the government. As Odria also wanted
to be another Fer6n, he used his wife,Maria, to channel
social services and charity work. Their whole relation to
the poor was pternalistic, and the settlements were named
after Odria himself, after his wife, or after the date of
his coup ("27 de Octubre").
With this policy towards squatter settlements,
Odria achieved three objectives: give inexpensive aid to
the poor, have a different relationship between the urban
poor and the State than that promoted by the APRA, and-
most important- get political support.
At the same time that Odria got support from the
squatters, he encouraged migration to the capital on what
Friedmann has called a "strategy of deliberate urbani-
zation". This strategy was supported by the highland elite
because out-migration postponed the collapse of the rural
social order of the highlands which was a feudal system,
an economic system based on the land.
From 1956, when Odria left power, to 1968, there
1Friedmann, John: The Strategy of Deliberate Urbanization.
Journal of the American Institute of Planners XXXIV,
No. 6, Nov. 1968
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was a 12 year democratic period. The first elections took
place with a weakened APRA that had just been allowed to
emerge from underground. The elected President, Manuel
Prado, a member of the oligarchy, a financier and banker,
appointed Pedro Beltran, the editor of "La Prensa", as
Prime Minister. Beltran encouraged the cooperative
approach for squatter settlements. For the country in
general he encouraged a policy of laissez-faire, which
was supported by his sector, the export oligarchy. Beltran
and his family were involved in urban real estate and
housing development, and he played a big role in the in-
troduction of mutual savings and loan associations in
Peru, according to Malpica. The export sector, of which
Beltrin was the leader, supported free trade and private
enterprise and opposed high taxes, large government pro-
grams and a large role for the State in the economy.
Their attitude was that if the private sector would grow,
its effect would trickle down to the rest of the society.
The export sector preferred laissez-faire politics, be-
cause high taxation would promote the emergence of an ur-
ban middle-class group that would be a political opponent
of the export sector. With respect to the system of pro-
perty, the maintenance of the high inequality status-quo,
1Malpica, Carlos: Los Duenios del Peru
Lima: Ediciones Ensayos Sociales, 1968
and the control of the land pointed to the importance of
a strong system of private property within the framework
of a capitalist land market. Finally, if tariffs were im-
posed on imported goods that the export sector consumed,
a new industrial class would emerge that might become a
threat to the exporters.
Beltrin tried to get popular support issuing low-
cost housing, and he carried out a massive campaign through
his newspapers "La Prensa" and "Ultima Hora". He opposed
public housing and maintained that only the private sec-
tor had the capacity to meet the housing needs of Lima.
He also promoted "Ciudad de Dios", a squatter settlement
for abandoned children which an Italian Catholic priest,
Padre Iluminatto, helped to organize and build. "La Prensa"
often criticized the lack of housing in Lima, and cited
"Ciudad de Dios" as evidence of the housing shortage Lima
faced. It has been said that the "Ciudad de Dios" was an
invasion planned by Beltran, and it is mentioned as a
curious situation in which a member of the feudal export
oligarchy was involved in a major land invasion. It is
clear that Beltran exploited the "Ciudad de Dios"' issue
for a long time, because it was convenient for him and his
group to do so.
The policy towards squatter settlements reflects
the interest of the urban real estate, and banking and
commercial interests that Prado represented. Therefore,
Prado took a strong position against the formation of
settlements. The proportion of evictions and attempted
evictions was twice as large as during the former period.
There was also a higher proportion of settlements formed
on disputed land. In an open contradiction to its
written policy, the Prado government encouraged the in-
vasion of land and the formation of squatter settlements.
when it was convenient for their interests. The Frado
group owned old houses in Lima's center which had be-
come slums. In order to recover those dwellings, squatter
settlements were encouraged. The reason for this was to
make it easier to evict residents of the inner city
slums. Later on, real estate developers, linked to the
interests of the Prado group, rehabilitated or pulled
down the old dwellings, giving way to gentrification.
With respect to the political atmosphere during
this period, the export sector realized that the position
of the traditional highland elites was on the verge of
collapse, and together with the coastal elite proposed
agrarian reforms. A commission on agrarian reform and
housing was created in 1956.
Beltrdn also tried to increase the utility of
the coastal desert lands with irrigation programs, and
1Collier, p. 73
actively supported colonization in the jungle region of
Peru. It can be concluded that this liberal era tried to
make squatter settlements independent of the State and
to show the poor to take care of themselves, thus en-
couraging the concept of self-help, and at the same time
reducing the availability of people to mobilize into ra-
dical action.
In conclusion, during the Prado period, autonomy
and self-help were the model promoted by the government.
APRA played an important role, being in command of a
federation of settlement associations: the "'Frente Unico
de Barriadas"(United Front of Squatter Settlements).
One invasion supported by this "Frente" has been mentioned
by Turner.1
In 1961, Congress approved Law 13517 which had two
basic purposes:1) to provide for the remodelling and lega-
lization of existing settlements, and 2) to provide an
alternative to the illegal formation of settlements. As
an alternative to invasions, Article 3 gave the "Cor-
poraci6n Nacional de la Vivienda" (National Housing Cor-
poration) the authority to form new settlements called
"urbanizaciones populares", lower class housing projects
in which the C.N.V. would lay out street grids, provide
1Turner, John F.C.: Barriers and Channels for Housing
Development in Modernizing Countries.
Journal of the A.I.P. XXXIINo.3,May 1967
services and build a rudimentary house in each lot. Most
important, the Law allowed for remodelling and granting
land titles of settlements already formed.
The elections of June 1962 did not lead to a clear
victory of any party. The APRA formed a coalition with its
old enemy Odria. The Army, APRA's enemy, reacted with a
"coup d'4tat" on July 18, apparently to prevent an opportu-
nistic coalition of former enemies and trying to present
an image of social reformers instead of that of protectors
of the establishment. The military government forcefully
tried to apply Law 13517 and supported private enterprise
in housing development through the formation of the
"Banco Nacional de la Vivienda" (National Housing Bank).
This government was not interested in seeking popular
support from settlers and ordered several violent evictions
of squatters before allowing elections after one year in
power.
This is the end of an important era in the history
of Peru, because after this period, and beginning in 1963,
the word "participation" would be a keyword in the policies
of the United States vis-a-vis Latin America through the
Alliance for Progress, and in the case of Peru through the
doctrine of the Acci6n Popular party founded in 1956 by
Architect F. Belaunde.
So far, the people, mobilized by the APRA party
had tried radical changes, but the Military who were the
other important actor in this power struggle, had de-
nied them the right to govern the country.
2. The Alliance for Progress and ECLA
2.1 ECLA
At the end of World War II, the United Nations
Organization was founded. Peru and other Latinamerican
countries supported the creation of this organization
which was to have strong impact in Latin America in the
coming decade.
The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)
was installed in Santiago de Chile and would be a source
of new ideas and theories that would give a new frame-
work to the relations between what were up to then called
"advanced" and "backward" countries.
The United Nations proposed an impersonal and ob-
jective measuring instrument that from then on would be
universal in order to compare countries. Nations would be
classified according to their economic performance as
"developed" and "underdeveloped". It follows naturally,
that from then on, economic development would be a goal
of priority in most underdeveloped countries.
In this context, ECLA, under the direction of
Raul Prebisch, presented an alternative position to ideas
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and models of economic development originated in the
United States of America and Europe. It would be the now
famous Theory of Dependency, and their founders would be
important actors in the scenery of political-economic
development; they would become famous as the "dependis-
tas". They used the history of Latin America to pro-
pose a new theory of the reasons for underdevelopment
and tried to find new ways to challenge and overcome
barriers against growth. They challenged the "monetarist"
position of Europe and the United States which essenti-
ally postulates that free international markets lead to
comparative advantages and an efficient international dis-
tribution of labor, maintaining that tariffs, quotes,
and other barriers to free markets should be eliminated.
ECLA showed that the historical trends of foreign
trade in Latin America were in open contradiction to the
monetarist position and argued that the division of la-
bor -which basically meant the production of prime ma-
terials by underdeveloped countries and the production of
manufactured and finished goods by developed countries -
resulted in a permanent deterioration of the terms of
trade.
ECLA pointed out that there were other factors
that conspired against economic development:
- the latifundio ownership of productive lands
- the skewed income distribution patterns
- the small size of the local Latin American markets.
ECLA proposed basic steps to change this situations
- foreign financing of investments at the level of $ 1
billion per year during 10 years
- fixed prices for Latin American export products
- the creation of a Local Development Bank
- the creation of national planning agencies to set up
priorities to allocate public and private investments.
This last part would become fundamental in the
creation of the Accidn Popular party that would become an
important actor in the politics of Peru in the decade of
the 1960's.
2.2 Alliance for Progress
The Alliance for Progress, an inter-American pro-
gram first proposed in 1958 by President Juscelino Kubit-
schek of Brazil, aimed to attack the generalized poverty
among Latin American peoples. This idea, which had its
roots in a variety of studies prepared by the Economic
Commission for Latin America, received enthusiastic
support from President John F. Kennedy, who announced the
formation of the Alliance for Progress to the assembled
representatives of Latin American governments on March 13,
1961, using the language of economic developments
"Our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire
world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic pro-
gress and social justice can best be achieved by free
men working within a framework of democratic institu-
tions."
This interest in Latin America was no doubt fueled
by the unexpected triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1958
which made clear that structures could be changed, even
if at the expense of democracy.
The Alliance for Progress was defined in the
"Chart of Punta del Este", Uruguay, in August 1961,as a
"vast effort to bring a better life to all the people of
the continent", based on the premise that "free men
working through the institution of representative demo-
cracy can best satisfy man's aspirations including those
for work, home and land, health and schools."2
The Alliance for Progress had 12 basic objectives3:
1) To achieve a growth rate of no less than 2.5% per capi-
ta per year, so as to attain levels of income capable
of assuring self sustaining development.
2) A more equitable distribution of national income.
1Martz,John D. and SchoultzLars: Latin America, the United
States and the Interamerican System. Boulder,Colorados
Westview Press, p. 10
2Fink, Matthias:Nationales Interesse und Entwicklungshilfe:
John F.Kennedy's Alliance for Progress.
Mutnchen: Minerva Publikation, Dez. 1977, p. 138
3Dominguez,Qarlos E.sThree modes of Planning and the Exper-
ience of Professional Planners.
Unpublished doctoral thesis, M.I.T.,August 1981, p. 126
3) Balanced diversification in national economic struc-
tures.
4) To accelerate the process of rational industrializa-
tion.
5) To raise greatly the level of agricultural output and
productivity.
6) To encourage agrarian reform.
7) To eliminate adult illiteracy, and to assure a minimum
of 6 years of primary education for each school age
child in Latin America.
8) To increase life expectancy by a minimum of five years,
and improve individual and public health.
9) To increase the construction of low cost housing for
low income families.
10) To maintain stable price levels.
11) To strengthen the existing agreements on economic inte-
gration.
12) To develop cooperative programs designed to prevent
excessive fluctuation in foreign exchange earnings,
and to facilitate the access of Latin American exports
to international markets.
In the "Declaration to the People of America",
the theme of participation was one of the main objectives:
"Improvement and strengthening of the democratic institu-
24
tions, through the rights of co-participation of all peo-
ples."'
What is really important is that the Alliance for
Progress acknowledged the need for structural reforms, such
as land reform, and income distribution as a prerequisite
for economic development. The Alliance's great importance
resides in the fact that it legitimized the necessity for
structural changes in Latin America and opened up a new
type of relationship between the United States of America
and the Latin American countries. It recognized that there
were prerequisites for economic development and encouraged
the nations south of the Rio Grande to go on with reforms.
It did not, however, make any mention of nationalizations
of foreign owned enterprises- these were to emerge as a
key issue in the next decade.
3. Fernando Belaunde and Accion Popular
It was the right time for Fernando Belaunde to
shine in Peruvian politics. He was a successful architect
and planner who at an early age became Dean of the Faculty
of Architecture in Lima. In his speech of June 8, 1956,
after having been elected candidate to the Presidency, he
said, "I have come straight from the lecture rooms of the
university to put into practice the lessons I have taught."2
1Fink, p. 139
2Bourricaud,Franccis:Power and Society in Contemporary Peru.
New YorksPraeger Publishers, 1970, p. 233
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His strategy for the elections was to undertake a tour of
Peru, going from village to village. This mobility was one
of his assets in the 1956 campaign and he made a point of
it in his speech of June 15, 1956:1
There are three candidates, but only one has carried
his message to every corner of the Republic: the others
have ignored most of the coastal area and have never
tried to visit the jungle, or ventured into the sierra
where most of our population lives and where the drama
of Peru is felt in all its keenness. I for my part
have crossed the Cordilleras ten times during this
campaign in search not of cheering crowds, but of in-
spiration and ideas.
Belaunde's doctrine, Accion Popularstressed self-help and
popular participation. In Peru, the tradition is that of
"popular co-operation", 2embodied in two basic institutions:
the Indian communities and the "cabildo" or municipal coun-
cil. Acci6n Popular glorifies the spirit of mutual aid
and co-operation among fellow-viallagers. "To stimulate
initative, which shapes men and forms leaders; to fan the
still ourning flame of creative spirit." 3
Accidn Popular is completed by planning. Belaunde
is fond of emphasizing that Peru's tradition of planning
1Ibid, p. 234
2Ibid, p. 239
3Belaunde T.,Fernando: Peru's Own Conquest.
Lima, 1965, p. 103
goes back to the Incas and is perhaps their most precious
legacy.1 At all events, the reference to the Inca system
throws most light on the importance of planning in Bela-
unde's doctrine. "The plan is thought primarily in real
terms and only secondarily in terms of money: It is an
architect's and planner's concept rather than that of an
economist or an auditor general."2
After being elected President of Peru in 1983,
Belaunde honored his motto "El Peru Construye" (Peru
Builds). According to Kuczinsky, "The major manifestation
of this attitude was a massive increase in public invest-
ment and in current government outlays." 3Kuczinsky also
mentions that "As an architect he was more interested in
physical achievements than in policies that might achieve
,,4
a result not tangible for several years." And he con-
tinues that "Belaunde displayed a healthy skepticism to-
ward economists, and his love of Peru and its people often
led him to digress from a financial discussion into a mono-
logue on some new physical achievement of his government:
1Ibid, p. 87
2Bourricaud, p. 241
3Kuczinsky, Pedro Pablos Peruvian Democracy under Economic
Stress. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,
1977, p. 51
4 Ibid, same page
how an Amazonian village had been reached by plane for the
first time, after the inhabitants had by themselves -under
Cooperaci6n Popular- built an airstrip." Participation
was seen by Belaunde as an essential part of development,
and development was physical achievement. He also encou-
raged political participation calling for municipal elec-
tions during his government.
In contrast to the tradition and precedents set by
past politicians and dictators such as Manuel A. Odria and
Manuel Prado, Belaunde looked for political support every-
where in the country. His public works and development
programs were located deep in the country, opposing the
concentration of central bureaucratic offices and local
urban hospitals which had been the trade-mark of the 1950's
in Peru. As an architect and planner, Belaunde focused his
attention and action on the decentralization of the coun-
try. He hoped to end the traditional pattern of migration
from the highlands to the coast by encouraging migration
to the regions east of the Andes, that is to say to the
Amazonian jungle region of Peru. Belaunde's dream was to
build a major highway along the edge of the jungle at the
eastern foothills of the Anes and open up the land to
settlers. He also had a program of agrarian land reform
1Ibid, same page
and had strong support from the rural population. He
believed that if the country's scarce resources were used
to improve the situation of squatter settlements in urban
areas, the result would be massive growth of squatter
settlements which would attract more migrants to the cities,
thus counteracting the positive effect of his other pro-
grams.
In 1967, the Mayor of San Martin de Porres, a dis-
trict of Limawhich was the main"barriada" formed by
Odria's government, promoted and had a law approved which
granted land tenure to the residents of the district,
without having to upgrade the dwellings as had been estab-
lished by Law 13517. As a result of this, the settlers of
the other "barriadas" threatened the government with a
demonstration in the main streets of Lima, if the bene-
fits of this new Law given to the San Martin de Porres
District were not extended to all other squatter settle-
ments. Under pressure, the government extended the bene-
fits of the law to all districts of the capital. It was
clearly a case in which pressure mobilized from below was
the immediate cause of a change in settlement policies. It
was also an opportunity in which traditional planners'
standards were relaxed in recognition of the role of sett-
lers in urban development.
The APRAwhich had a majority in Congress, also
controlled certain municipal governments, and this gave the
APRA a legal channel tor supporting settlement formation,
a fact that might account for the lack of invasions. The
proportion of evictions and attempted evictions in this
period was only 22%.
Belaunde had espoused, since his inaugural speech
as President on July 28, 1963, the nationalization of the
oil fields that were in the hands of the International Pe-
troleum Company, an American company which sub-leased the
area since 1914 from a British group, the London and Paci-
fic Petroleum Company, who had been granted a 99 year
lease by English owners in 1890.
In 1911, the Peruvian Corps of Mining Engineers
measured the area and found it to be 4000 times larger than
the area described in the legal documents. Accordingly,
the government in 1915 refused to go along with the situ-
ation. Eventually, in 1921, a controversial award was made
in Paris, favoring the British London and Pacific Petrole-
um Co.
In 1959, German Tito Gutierrez, a Congressman who
later would be appointed General Manager of Peruvian Natio-
nal Railways, verbalized the situation in Congress, refu-
sing to condone an agreement between the Peruvian Govern-
ment and the International Petroleum C., which called for
an increase in the price of gasoline.
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The fact that Belaunde tried to solve this problem
once and for all, resulted in a colder position of the U.S.
Government towards Belaunde which eventually exploded in
economic crisis: Peru got $ 90 million in financial aid
from July 1963 to June 1968 versus Brazil that got $ 1067
million, Colombia $ 353 million, and Chile $ 346 million.
In per capita figures, Chile got $ 40.09, vis-a-vis Peru's
$ 7.49. This attitude was resented by radical politicians
who later aecame important actors in the Velasco regime.
Another source of serious problems for President
Belaunde which eventually precipitated his downfall were
scandals in which members of the Armed Forces were in-
volved. There were persistent rumors in early 1968 that
the Navy, the Police and the Banco de la Nacion had orga-
nized a shipload of appliances that were smuggled on one
of the vessels of the Peruvian Navy. The bazars of the
Police were a channel for contraband and were stocked with
1
a large amount of duty-free goods. A commission, headed by
H. Vargas, an APRA Deputy, antagonized the Army who dis-
liked being investigated. The outcome was that a book
written by H. Vargas in which he explained in detail the
2
findings of the commission, was seized and destroyed.
Problems of international market prices for Peru-
1 Kuczinski, p. 215
2 Vargas Haya, Hector: Contrabando, Lima, 1976
vian exports, domestic production declines and inflation
provoked a 40 percent devaluation in 1967, just one day
after President Belaunde had - in an awkward move - made
the stability of the currency a point of honor during a
television address to the nation. From then on, his govern-
ment lost all credibility in the eyes of the nation.
From June to October 2, 1968 two cabinets were
appointed in a desperate attempt to find a solution to the
economic problems of the country. The Government of the
United States, by now worried by the Viet-Nam War, restric-
ted financial help, and the Peruvian Congress was the
scene of bitter argument between different parties who
argued for the best way to handle the situation. The fact
that APRA had the majority in Congress seems to suggest
that they did little to help in the crisis, and instead
had in mindto triumph in the 1969 election.
From then on, it was almost sure that the Military
would stage a coup d'4tat, in order to prevent the APRA
from getting into power, as they had done in 1932 and 1962.
Chapter II
THE VELASCO REGIME% 1968-1975
In 1968, Peru was at an intermediate stage of mo-
dernization, industralization and political mobilization
compared to the other Latin American countries.
Oligarchic domination was steadily decreasing, as
economic power had shifted from the land-holding oligarchy
toward mining, fishing, and manufacturing sectors. Part of
the old oligarchy, the owners of the coastal sugar plan-
tations, managed to retain political power due to over re-
presentation in the Congress, and from there influenced the
mass media. Unions were organized . They were stronger in
the coastal sugar plantations than elsewhere. Although ur-
ban labor was weak as a sociopolitical force at societal
level, it had organizational penetration in crucial sectors
of industry and transportation. In the Peruvian Corporation
Railways, for instance, the Carmen's Union and the Workers'
Union, the strongest of the four unions, were affiliated
with the C.T.P. (Confederacion de Trabajadores Peruanos )
(Confederation of Peruvian Workers) which was controlled by
the APRA.
OrloveBenjamin : The Decline of Local Elites: Canchis in
Southern Peru. ins Adams, R. and Fogelson R.(eds): The
Ethnography of Power. New York: Academic Press, 1976
In 1966, the C.G. T.P. (Confederacion General de Tra-
bajadores del Peru) (General Workers' Confederation of Peru)
was formed. During the economic crisis of 1967, and when
the CTP tried to control union demands for higher wages,
the number of unions affiliated to CGTP increased, even
though the CGTP was not yet officially recognized by the
Ministry of Work. From 1963 to 1968, a total of 1221 new
unions were recognized, of which 447 belonged to the in-
dustrial sector, an indicator of continued mobilization.1
The Belaunde government had followed a decentrali-
zation strategys in its development plan it had sought to
open the Amazonian region by means of the "Carretera Margi-
nal de la Selva". As opposed to former Presidents Odria
and Prado who had looked for popular support among the new
migrants to Lima, namely the inhabitants of the squatter
settlements 2, Belaunde had dedicated his efforts to pro-
mote large scale economic development projects. Only 15
squatter settlements originated during his period, versus
30 during Odria's (1948-1956) and 30 during Prado's (1956-
1962).3 During this period from 1961 to 1972, the popula-
tion of squatter settlements grew from 20.2% to 27.2% con-
tributing to social mobilization.4
1StephensE.H.: The Politics of Workers Participation.
New York:Academic Press, 1980, p. 83
2Collier, p. 151
3Ibid, Table 11.9
4Ibid, same page
As the pressure resulting from the mobilization at
the bottom of the system started disrupting the traditio-
nal order, the role of the Military grew more and more con-
troversial within the Military leadership. The repression
of the "'guerillas" in 1965 had a strong impact on the Mili-
tary. They realized that there was a real threat of a so-
cialist revolution and they, the protectors of the status-
quo, would be among its first victims.
Therefore, the Army took rapid action. On October 3,
1968, only 6 months before elections were due, a Military
Junta, led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, staged a coup
d'4tat that ousted President Belaunde.
The Military Government made explicit that popular
participation and self management was one of its main mid-
term generic objectives and its espoused theory:
Actual participation of national majority groups in the
basic decisions of the country, said majority groups
to be organized in intermediate institutions such as
trade unions, cooperative associations etc... It is
not possible to think of development (which involves
both the economic and social aspects) without parti-
cipation of the majority groups in those decisions
which reflect upon the final orientation of society.
To ensure such participation, it is essential to en-
courage the establishment and strengthening of social
organizations such as cooperative associations and
trade unions through which the expression of said
popular participation will be chanelled.
1 Mid-term Development Policy Basic Guidelines,
Republica del Peru, Instituto Nacional de Planifica-
cion, Lima, April 1970, p.1 1
The Yugoslav experience served as a lighthouse for the Pe-
ruvian generals who were looking for a "third model" to
solve the problems of underdevelopment, poverty, unemploy-
ment, inequality, illiteracy, illnesses, .....
They were looking for a humanist model of social organi-
zation that would ease efforts at developments while mini-
mizing human costs. The importance given to the involve-
ment of the people in the development process made the po-
tential role of the workers' participation a controversial
issue in the political arena.
A new generation of army officers was made aware of
the problems of the country in the "Centro de Altos Estu-
dios Militares, CAEM (Center of Higher Military Studies). 2
A "new professionalism" emerged, contributing to the emer-
gence of a new elite which
"(1) perceived that its corporate survival required
fundamental changes to be made in Peru's social, eco-
nomic and political structures. (2) concluded that the
traditional political system could not make these
fundamental changes (3) had developed within its own
schooling and intelligence system an alternative pro-
gram of structural change and societal development
(4) was confident that these same schooling and in-
telligence systems had formed the necessary cadres to
implement their program and (5) believed that it and
only it had the power to impose the program." 3
North, Liisa:Interview with Gen. J.Tantalean Vanini.
Caretas, May 21, 1973
3 stepanAlfred:The State and Society:Feru in Comparative
Perspective. Princeton University Press, N.J., 1978,p.36
2 Villanueva,Victor:El CAEM y la Revolucion de La Fuerza
Armada. Lima:IEP, 1973
The Peruvian Army was committed to reform by two main
reasons: (a) the reforms were necessary for the military
self-preservation, (b) the Military had to control the
State in order to make sure these changes were made,
These reforms were printed in the "Plan Inca",
dated October 3, 1968. It is open to speculation why the
plan was not published until 1974.1
1. Urban Participation
Due to his lack of popular support, Velasco turned
to squatter settlements, as Odria and Beltran had done be-
fore, giving a twist to the policy that Belaunde had
successfully maintained since 1963.
On December 3, 1968, the government announced the
creation of the "Organismo Nacional de Pueblos Jovenes",
or ONDEPJOV (the National Organization for the Develop-
ment of Young Towns) in order to improve the existing
squatter settlements.2 Its importance was clear: it was
directly responsible to the President and the Prime Minis-
ter. The government had already decided to upgrade the
squatter settlements semantically, denominating them
"young towns" instead of "shanty towns" (barriadas) as
1Stepan, p. 145
2Collier, p. 97
they were known before.
On April 29, 1971, a large invasion of public land
spread to neighboring areas in a series of invasions that
continued until May 12. It was perfectly timed to coin-
cide with a meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-
american Development Bank, an agency which had previously
financed low-income housing projects in Peru. During this
invasion, a serious clash occured between the Catholic
Church and the Minister of the Interior, Gen. Artola:
As the invasion took on large dimensions quickly and tens
of thousands of people were involved after a short while,
Police moved in and brutally tried to disperse the inva-
ders. In the process, two invaders were killed . Bishop
Bambaran, a member of ONDEPJOV then held a mass on the
invaded land. Artola had him arrested , but Bambaren was
freed after 13 hours and a few days later, the Minister
1
of the Interior, Gen. Artola, was forced to resign.
According to Peattie, "On the seventh day after the ink
vasion was begun the government offered the organizer a
larger tract of land on which the invaders might take up
lots with the formal permission of the government."2
Eventually the settlers were persuaded to move there.
1Ibid, p. 105
2Peattie, Lisa R.: Villa El
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This settlement later became wellknown as "Villa El Salva-
dor", the showpiece of Velasco's urban strategy of incor-
poration.
All these events were clear indications to the
government that it needed to augment its ability to deal
with low-income sectors of society capable of mass politi-
cal action. Decree Law 18896 which established SINAM1OS
(Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilizacion Social)
(National System for the Support of Social Mobilization)
was an attempt to do so. It declared that the objective
of the organization was to create a link between the
government and the people. It becomes clear, after the
Pamplona invasion , that the people were already organized
and participating, but not in the way the government wan-
ted: therefore the founding of SINAMOS.
SINAMOS was not only concerned with squatter settle-
ments, but also with cooperatives, agrarian reform, and
other spheres of action. The Organic Law of SINAMOS, D.L.
19352 of April 4, 1972, described as its goal the estab-
lishment of a basically self-directed economy, in which
means of production are largely controlled by the workers
themselves. Squatter settlements fit into this framework.2
1Ibid, p. 8
2Collier, p. 107
A very positive aspect of the policies adopted by Velas-
co's government towards squatter settlements was legis-
lature of land tenure. Many more land titles were granted
from 1970 to 1972 than had been throughout the 1960's.
One of the requirements to be eligible for land tenure was
a certificate of civil marriage. In this way, SINAMOS tried
to incorporate the new migrants to new ways and thus exten-
ded"the rule of law to the settlements."1
The other concern of SINAMOS was to control politi-
cal opposition, neutralize the APRA and Acci6n Popular
Committess and avoid the formation of urban guerillas as
had taken place in Buenos Aires.
By 1974, Velasco was closely identified with Villa
El Salvador which was called the "world's first self-
managing urban community."2 It was the first community in
greater Lima which was served by a new type of oversized
buses, a policy that reflects some of the government's
priorities.
In July 1973, the "First Convention of Villa El Sal-
vador" was held. Participants included leaders from the
community and a group of radicalized intellectuals from
SINAMOS, committed to an effort to build a new and better
11bid, p. 114
2 Ibid, p. 112
kind of community in the new barrio. The discussions held
in Villa El Salvador reflected the great debate going on
within the government at this period about the merits of
the cooperative form of organization and a self-managed
form called "property of social interest". The community
organization of the barrio first became re-structured as
an "Integrated, Communal Self-Managing Cooperative", soon
to be revised to the Self-Managing Urban Community of
Villa El Salvador (Comunidad Urbana Auto-gestionaria El
Salvador or CUAVES). The concept was that of an "Enter-
prise-City" "rejecting capitalist interests." It was a
model to be imitated.
The possibility of urban refors, as carried out in
Cuba in 1960, was also studied by the Velasco regime. The
exchange value of public lands, old houses and slums was
low for the actual owners, but its use value was extremely
high for poor migrants from the highlands, who were usually
underemployed or worked in the so-called underground econ-
omy. This position was taken by the Christian Democratic
Party and the magazine "Oiga" during the first year of the
military rule. Eventually, a law on rent control was passed,
by which a tenant would only pay one tenth of the declared
value of the property per year. The law had loopholes, and
soon owners charged rights of "garage use", "key use", and
1Feattie, p. 10
so on to get around the law. An attempt was also made to
stop land speculation in areas of future urban expansion
and at least in one case, in Avenida Javier Prado in one
of Lima's high income neighborhoods, plots of land were
distributed at random among applicants at nominal prices.
2. Rural Participation
In 1969, the Agrarian Reform Law was passed. Before
the Reform, the landholding pattern was highly skewed1:
14% of the landowners possessed 75.9% of the total area
and 83.2% of independent farmers worked properties of 5
hectares or less. This was not only economically, but
also socially unfair. In the Peruvian highlands the sys-
tem was medieval and cruel; as Mc Clintock points out,
"Frequently hacendados flogged their peons, violated their
wives, and required that they kneel and kiss their hands. 2
In the 1960s, this kind of abuse was rare, but the hacen-
dado still had great power and was often verbally abusive,
being in total control of the hacienda politics.
With the Agrarian Reform Law, a whole set of parti-
cipation mechanisms was set in movements the government
established the "Confederacion Nacional Agraria"(National
1Cleaves, P.S. and Scurrah,M.J.sAgriculture, Bureaucracy
and Military Government in Peru. Ithaca and London: Cor-
nell University Press, 1980, p. 31
2Mc Clintock, C.: Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change
in Peru. Princeton University Press, N.J., 1981, p.77
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Agrarian Confederation) as the one legitimate organ of ex-
pression of farm interests. The government also organized
the "Cooperativas Agrarias de Produccion" (CAPs or Agrari-
an Cooperatives of Production), the "Sociedades Agrarias
de Interes Social" (SAIS or Agrarian Social Interest So-
cieties, Integral Rural Settlement Progjects (PIAR), Commu-
nal Cooperatives, and Integral Development Projects (PID)
to stimulate local units of participation of a fully co-
operative nature. These organizations were united in the
above mentioned "Confederacion Nacional Agraria". But there
was top down control for reasons of internal security.
There was strong opposition to military policies
from the workers of the coastal sugar plantations in the
north of Peru. They were in the majority strong partisans
of the APRA party and traditionally against the Military.
The incorporation of these workers and other low income
groups into the process of controlled participation, was
another task of SINAMOS. 2
Cotler 3believes that because of popular pressure,
the regime moved toward police repression in addition to
1Bourque,S.C. and Scott Palmer,D.: TAnsforming the Rural
Sector: Government Policy and Peasant Response. in: A.F.
Lowenthal(ed.)The Peruvian Experiment:Continuity and
Change under Military Rule. Princeton University Press,
1975,p. 191
2Stepan, p. 121
3Cotler,Julio: The New Mode of Political Domination in
Peru. in: Lowenthal, p. 68
its attempts to control popular political participation
through organizations like SINAMOS.
Nevertheless, there was a real attempt to incor-
porate workers into self-management and "comuneros" were
appointed members of the board of the SAIS or CAP or PID;
yet, the director was usually an engineer. In most cooper-
atives, members' desire for the expertise of the engin-
eers was overwhelmed by their fears that the technicians
would usurp status and power, as was indeed the case in
many instances. Thus, technicians' salaries were cut,and
many directors were fined. The average annual salary of a
director was under $4,000 a year , a low figure for a
university graduate with field experience. There were also
tensions between the "comuneros" and the engineers who took
the director's job. Mc Clintock describes very accurately
a situation in which in a dialogue an intoxicated Vice-
President of the "Comunidad" tells the Director that he
is"not wanted, that everything was fine before he came",
after having made the point that he was the Vice-President.2
In many cases, "comuneros" without background were
appointed "administradores" (administrators), as for ex-
ample in the case of the hacienda Pachacayo, belonging to
1 Mc Clintock, p.137
2 Ibid, same page
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the SAIS Tupac Amaru. Administrator Ruben Zarate was inter-
ested in a "trout-farm" which would provide fish for the
central Andes region. The problem was that a simple cost-
benefit analysis showed that the project was not profi-
table because the cost of pools and the food for the fish
were higher than the benefits the SAIS got from selling
the trout. Nevertheless, Zarate managed to be in good
standing with foreign missions such as the Dutch Technical
Mission and,not quite in accordance with his beliefs in
equal educational opportunities for all children, he man-
aged to get his daughter accepted in the rather elitist
German-Peruvian School in Lima.
In the process of land reform, there was also petty
corruptions the forms to be filled would be hidden, and
peasants had to pay for them, although the forms were
supposed to be free.
There was also lack of technical expertise, or when
there was expertise there was lack of resources. One
tragic example was the plague which wiped out the "Ihuando"
plantation of citric fruit which until 1968 had been one
of the most prosperous estates of the coastal region of
Peru. The Agrarian reform was most effective in the
Southern Sierra, because it destroyed the feudal struc-
ture of the local society, making the change irreversible.
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3. The Industry: Workers' Self-Management
On May 2, 1974, the Law of "Comunidad Industrial"
(Labor Community) was enacted. Scott Palmer says, "Per-
haps the most far reaching innovation was a labor communi-
ty concept requiring companies employing six or more wor-
kers to undertake profit sharing (lo percent) and worker
ownership up to 50% through purchase of collective shares
from profits (15%)." 1 The labor community or CI (Communi-
dad Industrial) was supposed to receive 15% of profits be-
fore tax, and to distribute 10% in cash to individual wor-
kers. After the 50% ownership percentage was reached, the
CI could use the 15% of profits for investment in other
enterprises. Initially, the CI would have one representa-
tive on the board of directors, and this representation
would be proportional to the number of shares owned by the
CI until the 50% limit was reached and the goal of self-
management was accomplished.
The CI was self-managed in its internal matters.
All members of the CI would elect a council whose members
would,in due course, elect the representatives of the CI
on the board of directors. The General Assembly was re-
quired to meet twice a year and approve the report on
activities and accounts and decide the uses of the part
Scott PalmerDavid: Peru - The Authoritarian Tradition.
New York:Praeger, 1980, p. 109
of the fund that was legally left to the free disposition
of the CI. The general fund was really the income of the CI,
from its shares in the enterprise. Its use was specified
partly by the law, and it was to be used as compensation
for CI members leaving the organization and for adminis-
trative costs. The council was supposed to carry out the
daily administration of the CI and to advise and supervise
the CI representatives on the board.
It is important to realize that although these ex-
periences in self-management provided training in internal
affairs, it did not give the workers the opportunity to
participate directly in decision-making related to the con-
crete work situation in the firm. "Participation of rank
and file workers in enterprise decisions was restricted to
indirect election, via the CI council, of representatives
with joint consultation rights at the highest level."'
Completing the CI Statute was an Employment Stability Law.
This meant that for all practical purposes, and under nor-
mal conditions, a worker had tenure for life, granted to
him after only three months.
In my personal experience, this law accounted for
a lot of inefficiency and abuse on the part of workers. For
instance, workers would go to work inebriated. A chemical
test had to be taken, but the worker had to provide a sam-
1Stephens, p. 93
ple which, as advised by the union representative, he would
dilute, and the test would show no evidence of intoxication
at a "dangerous level".
Through implementation of the Industrial Law, the
Military had several important - and conflicting- goals:
1.- Increased state control
2.- Domestic private sector incentives
3.- Increased control over foreign investment
4.- More opportunities for workers through participation
and eventually ownership.
Other objectives were to solve Peru's unemployment
problem, train manpower outside of the formal educational
system, upgrade worker housing and provide common health,
education, and recreational services to workers and their
families.
Around 1975, there were 3,533 "Comunidades Indus-
triales" with 199,179 members: 78% of all eliglible indi-
viduals and 4.3% of the economically active population of
Peru. 2
Knight, Peter T: New Forms of Economic Organization in
PerusToward Workers "Self Management" in: Lowenthal
2Scott Palmer, p. 110
4. Participation in State Owned Enterprises
The expansion of the Public Sector was one of the
main characteristics of Velasco's program. The state owned
companies can be classified in three groups:
a) Those taken from foreign capital: oil (Petroperu),
copper (Centromin), iron ore (Hierroperu), cable and
telephone (Entelperu) and railways (Enafer);
b) Those from the fishing industry: Epchap (marketing)
and Pescaperu (fishing);
c) State shipping line (CPV), the hidroelectric system
(Electroperu), steel enterprise (Siderperu), the flag
carrier (Aeroperu), and other mineral exports (Miinero-
peru) and for merketing (CEOCAP).
This sector was largely formed by nationalized private
companies, previously in the hands of foreign multinational
enterprises. The focus of the analysis will be the Empresa
Nacional de Ferrocarriles del Peru, that will represent
a case study of a typical company. It will be shown that
participation attempts were restricted to the workers. The
bureaucracy and technocracy were marginated from the be-
ginning from the participatory process, and felt alienated
from the process of change that was taking place in the
country.
1Fitzgerald, E.V.K.: The State and Economic Develo ment :
Peru since 1968. Cambridge University Press, 1976,p. 32
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In only thirteen years, from 1968 to 1981, Peru-
vian National Railways went through a serious structural
transformation. The new administration would change "The
Peruvian Corporation Ltd.", a British owned enterprise that
owned 70% of the railway network existing inPeru. The high-
ly taylorean and weberian institution administered by the
British, that seemed an extension of the British Empire in
South America turned into a highly politicized agency,
where trade unions increasingly gained power, and where bu-
reaucratic groups of newly appointed civil servants staged
games of power with former railway officers who tried to
preserve the taylorean model and ended up playing power
games such as the ones described by Crozier. In 1975, Gen.
Velasco Alvarado was deposed by General Morales Bermudez.
With this new change, trade unions consolidated their new-
ly acquired power, and government controlled all the act-
ions of Peruvian Railways, by then called Empresa Nacional
de Ferrocarriles del Peru or ENAFER-PERU. Power struggles
became increasingly bitter, and there was a period in 1979,
when in a period of only three months, three different per-
sons were appointed to the position of general manager,
culminating A period of administrative chaos. During the
1975-1979 period, an important role in ENAFER was played by
General Jorge Gomeq Becerra, who was chairman of the board.
A former head of the Army Intelligence, he was in perma-
nent contact with the military high command and the trade
unions, although he was bitterly opposed to the Minister of
Transport, who did not have the power to remove him.
Peruvian Railways started being built in the 1870s
under the management of an American entrepreneur: Henry
Meiggs. The Southern Railway and part of the actual Cen-
tral Railway were already built when, in 1879, Peru went
to war with Bolivia against Chile in the so-called "salt-
peter war" or "Guerra del Pacifico". To finance the war
effort, Peru borrowed capital from British banks. When
eventually Peru lost the war, the British shareholders
formed "The Peruvian Corporation Ltd" and were given the
national railway network as part of the payment ,given
the bankrupcy of the Peruvian State. 2
The British, then at the zenith of the Victorian
era, brought with then their tremendously efficient ad-
ministrative system and, most important, the experience
they had acquired in the course of administering the Bri-
tish Empire.They extended the Central Railway from Chicla
(km. 141) to Huancayo (km. 346), passing through the min-
ing cities of Morococha and La Croya. They used the local
hand labor for operations, and for highly skilled labor
resorted to Great Britain. For example, engine drivers were
1Stewart, Watt: Henry Meiggs, a Yankee Pizarro. Durham,
2 N.C.:Duke University Press, 1946, p. 69
Bonilla, Heraclio:Guano y Burguesia en el Peru. Lima: IEP,
Lima, 1974
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all British until after World War II. The administra-
tion was totally British or first generation Peruvian of
British parents. The former occupied high ranking posi-
tions such as those of vice-president, general manager,
chief operations; the latter were employed in low middle-
management jobs such as those of dispatcher, traffic in-
spector, etc.
In 1963, the Peruvian Corporation Ltd. took an im-
portant step towards modernization. It was decided to
change the fleet of locomotives from steam to diesel-
electric models. It was the era of cheap oil, and a loan
of the World Bank guaranteed by the Peruvian government
made feasible the purchasing of 35 modern locomotives.
Equally important, it decided to change its policy
with respect to personnel: instead of bringing British
railway engineers and administrators, the Peruvian Corpo-
ration Ltd. decided to contract young Peruvian engineers,
pay the highest salaries in the market and send them for
a minimum period of two years to be trained in management,
and civil or mechanical engineering in the different
sections of British Railways. Additionally, some prelimi-
nary steps were taken to implement a department of systems,
using primitive Unirecord equipment.
In 1968, Ernesto de Losada, a young Peruvian civil
engineer trained in England was appointed general manager.
During the same year, a general strike was declared by
the trade unions. The Peruvian Corporation Ltd. ordered
to maintain the freight service, and only the passenger
trains were cancelled for security reasons. The freight
trains were run and operated by Peruvian railway officers
trained in Britain and by Peruvian staff of the depart-
ment of traffic, traction and engineering who did not be-
long to the trade unions. After almost one month of strike,
the unions gave up, and the Peruvian Corporation Ltd.
had succeeded in breaking the strike withouth British
intervention. The trade unions had been unsuccessful to
break the power of the company.
It was in May 1971 that the Banco Industrial del
Peru appointed German Tito Gutierrez as Acting Manager
(Administrador General) of the Peruvian Corporation Ltd.
One year later, he was appointed General Manager of the
newly created Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles del Peru,
ENAFER-PERU, which was formed by joining the railways of
the Peruvian Corporation Ltd. and the railways of the
Peruvian State. Gutierrez, a civil engineer, was member
of the Partido Social Progresista, an extreme left party
and had been candidate for the vice-presidency of Peru in
the elections of 1963. A tough, ascetic man, he was a
former congressman who had represented Arequipa, the
second most important city in Peru. While a representative,
he had fought for the nationalization of oil, mineral
and transportation companies.
Ernesto de Losada, the General Manager appointed
by the board of Peruvian Corporation Ltd. resigned immedi-
ately, and so did most of the British officers.
Two major accidents happened in May 1971, just
after the Corporation had been intervened by the Banco In-
dustrial: in the Central Railway, the origin of the de-
railment was a broken rail, and in the Southern Railway
the cause of the accident was excess of speed. Immediately,
Gutierrez asked for technical help from the Ministry of
Transport and contacted the judge of Arequipa to imprison
the Manager, the Chief Traction, Chief Traffic, and Chief
Engineer of the Southern Railway. Charles Ricketts, the
Chief Traction, a Peruvian of British descendence who was
a brother-in-law of General Ernesto Montagne, then Prime
Minister of Peru, phoned Gutierrez and threatened to make
a scandal if these persons were not freed immediately.
Gutierrez gave up, but the committees of the Ministry of
Transport used interrogating techniques in which they re-
venged the contempt which formerly they had been shown by
the Peruvian Corporation officers when dealing with them..
Eventually, all the officers were found not guilty, but
harmony had been severely disturbed and a power struggle
had started between the bureaucrats appointed by the go-
vernment and the old railway officers.
Training of any kind was stopped, and Gutierrez spoke of
his bad feelings about British trained officers openly.
He was often heard saying: "Anybody can be a railwayman".
It was clear that the participatory policies of the govern-
ment were not to be extended to the technocracy or bureau-
cracy. Gutierrez appointed Cesar Macedo, a lwyer, as Chief
of Insdustrial Relations. Macedo would go to the districts
without coordinating with any of the district superinten-
dants, and have informal meetings with the workers to talk
abouttheir problems. This policy provoked a strong reac-
tion from among the officials against any type of partici-
patory policy.They were "de facto" excluded .
As Gutierrez did not trust anybody of the railway
staff, he brought new officers and changed their name from
"officials" to "civil servants". He promoted Clemente Pefia,
a person who had done some work in systems, to assistant
general manager. Some Peruvian officers who had not been
too successful with the British administration, joined the
group, and polarization occured at all levels. The trade
unions acquired tremendous power and the general manager
kept an open door policy with them. The Ministry of Trans-
port, formerly a non-important entity, was the Ministry to
whom the railways had to report. More important, perhaps,
railway officials got the same raise as the rest of em-
ployees or clerks, nothing else. In this sense, they were
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participating in the process, in a negative way. Gu-
tierrez did not realize, thpugh, that some trade unions
would use their newly acquired power to get more money.
The situation climaxed in the period from 1976-1978, when
an engine driver received equal salary as the manager of
the two railways, and of course higher wages than all the
other officers.
Chapter III
THE MORALES BERIUDEZ REGIME
Although the Velasco government pretended to be
"neither right nor left", it was becoming increasingly
clear that it was going left. In mining towns in the
high Andes such as Huancavelica, posters and banners
could be read with anti-American and anti-Nixon slo-
gans. SINAMOS played an avtive part in organizing and
mobilizing people for those activities, and the general
feeling was one of dissatisfaction, which erurted in riots
in all major cities of Peru at the end of 1973. Arequipa,
Cuzco, Puno and Ayacucho were the scenes of demonstrati-
ons against the government, and in Cuzco the offices of
SINAMOS were burnt.
According to Philip , "The 1973 riots were initi-
ated by SUTEP, the dissident and Aprista led teachers'
union, and were followed up by students, small farmers and
other groups.
The Oil Crisis of 1974 hit the country particularly
hard. At the beginning of the 1970s, there was talk and
were hopes of an oil boom in the northern Amazon region.
1Philip, George D.E.: The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian
Military Radicals 1968-1975.University of London,
The Athlone Press, 1978, p. 143
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A trans-Andean pipeline was built from the oil wells to the
Pacific. But the expectations were too high. There was less
oil than expected and only a few companies, namely Petro-
peru and Occidental, stayed in the area. Inspite of this,
the country had to pay the construction of the pipeline
somehow, and therefore, most of the oil revenues had to be
used for its transportation.
When oil prices went up, the government took a
drastic and somewhat naive measures automobiles were
allowed to circulate only five days a week. The auto owners
had the choice of not going out by car either Monday/Wednes-
day or Tuesday/Thursday. Every car had to display a white
or red sticker accordingly, under the motto "Ahorro es Pro-
gresso" (Savings mean Progress).
The gasoline price went up fifty percent and kept
on raising, and the people started getting uncomfortable
with the knowledge that high ranking Military had not only
free cars but also free gasoline. The Military painted
their cars in "civilian" colors, trying to be less con-
spicuous, and aggressive civilians exhibited a sticker
"Yo pago mi gasolina, y Usted?" (I pay for my gasoline,
and you) next to the red or white one sticker prescribed
by the government.
Adding up to the problems of the government, the
"anchoveta" fish disappeared from the coast of Peru, and
the fish meal industry, an important source of foreign es-
change for Peru in the 1960's, sharply decreased its out-
put.
The fish meal baron, Rodolfo Banchero, was murdered,
and his secretary, Eugenia Sessarego, a young and indepen-
dent woman belonging to the high-middle income sector of
Lima, was accused, tried in a witch-like atmosphere, and
found guilty without conclusive evidence. "Expreso", the
official newspaper published details of the private life of
Banchero and the relationship with Sessarego in a rather
sordid way. Needless to say, the Lima middle income sector
protested without success against the way the trial had
been conducted and the unfair and shocking manner that
cheap publicity was being made for the government, trying
to make Sessarego a symbol of the local decadence of the
former ruling classes. This affair widened the existing
gap between the government and a great part of the popula-
tion.
In February 1975, the Police Force declared a ge-
neral strike, demanding higher wages and better treat-
ment from the Military. On the second day of the strike,
there was looting organized by the APRAI that tried to ca-
pitalize the situation. The Army suffocated the riots with
brutality. Tanks were sent to the streets and people
1Thorndike, Guillermo; No, mi General. Lima: Editorial
Mosca Azul, 1975
machine-gunned. Many policemen were killed because they
decided to carry on with the strike. The number of the
dead is not yet known.
This event proved to be the beginning of the end of
the Velasco era. Some months earlier, Velasco had in a
very unwise movement taken over the newspapers and closed
all magazines which protested against the drastic measures
and demanded free press. As there was no free press to re-
port on the mentioned tragic events, word of mouth spread
the news augmenting to the seriousness of the situation.
General curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 p.m. was declared, and
shots were heard throughout the night all aroung the city,
while tanks circulated the whole night patrolling the
city. It was evident that the government had lost popular-
ity and support. Velasco was seriously ill and the feeling
was that he was no longer in control of the situation.
What had seemed a participatory process had become a dic-
tatorship that was leaning strongly to the left.
One of the policies of the government had been to
establish diplomatic relations with third-world countries
that belonged to the "non-aligned" group or "Group of the
77". The Lima-Sheraton Hotel and the new Civic Center had
been chosen as the scenario of a meeting of the non-
alligned nations of the world. As Cuba was one of the most
prominent non-alligned nations, the people of Peru looked
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at the meeting with skeptical and apprehensive eyes. General
Velasco was scheduled to open the meeting with a speech to
the leaders of different nations, but it was not to be: on
the morning of the inauguration day, August 29, 1975,
General F.Morales Bermudez launched a coup, supported by
the commands of all five military regions of the country.
Even though Gen. Morales Bermudez, in his speech to
the Nation, promised to carry on with "the Revolution", he
took drastic measures to return the country to a demo-
cratic center.
General Rudecindo Zavaleta, who later became Chair-
man of the Board of Peruvian National Railways, was given
the task of dismantling SINAMOS. He succeeded the radical
and leftist Gen. L.Rodriguez Figueroa, good friend of Raul
Castro. The "Confederaci6n Nacional Agraria" that had been
led by the charismatic Avelino Mar, was given less and less
importance. The new government initially pretended to con-
tinue with Velasco's policies of participation, but in
fact participation was discouraged, in this "second phase"
of the revolution .
For example, the change of government "represented
a very basic change in the political context for Villa El
Salvador. SINAMOS ceased to play an important role, and
the SINAMOS leaders who had been involved in community or-
ganization and self-management dro-pped out of sight."'
1Feattie, p. 12
The bureaucratic apparatus mounted by the previous regime
was dismantled:
In 1979 the Peruvian government began a re-structuring
of the administrative apparatus for settlements like
Villa El Salvador. The central organization for Young
Towns was abolished. Its various functions were par-
celled out to a number of different offices in the
Ministry of Housing. A new law - number 22612- was
drafted to replace Law 13517; this legislation was to
place the service and other requirements of marginal
settlements within the normal municipal structure, on
the same basis as any other urban area."
These actions were designed to diffuse the power of the
Community Associations and Young Towns that had been shown
in the general strike of July 1978, the first in twenty
years..
Local industrialists were not investing, afraid of
the consequences of the CI, and that it might lead to
communism.
State owned enterprises had by then become a syno-
nym for inefficiency and bureaucracy in the derogatory
sense of the word.
General Jorge Gomez Becerra was appointed chairman
of the board of ENAFER-PERU. His approach undermined the
discipline and lowered the morale of the officers. He
maintained an open door policy with the trade unions, and
1Peattie, P. 17
not only criticized the officials, but also the new gen-
eral manager, Edmundo Montagne, brother of the Prime Minis-
ter of General Velaso's regime. Montagne did not have the
support of either the Chairman of the Board nor the Minis-
ter of Transport. G6mez Becerra's sense of participation
was restricted to the workers and to being "chummy" with
them, making at the same time the officials a target, a
common enemy.
Although the law of creation of Peruvian National
Railways very clearly stated that a client could not be
part of the board (for obvious reasons), the powerful
Ministry of Energy and Mines appointed a member of Cen-
tromin-Peru, a mining company that owned the railway La
Oroya - Cerro de Pasco in the central Andes. In this way,
Gomez Becerra made sure to have a railway expert next to
him: Ciro Odiaga, railway manager of Centromin-Peru (for-
merly known as Cerro de Pasco Corporation), had in 1968
worked as superintendant of the state owned railways and
was ready to show his knowledge and experience in rail-
ways to other members of the board.
Between April and July 1979, three persons occu-
pied the position of general manager, while Gen. Gomez
Becerra held his position. Three persons occupied the
position of Minister of Transport, but all three were un-
able to remove him until July 1979, when ENAFER was for
the third time declared in process of reorganization. The
Minister appointed Gen. Rudecindo Zabaleta as new Chairman
of the Board. The Minister of Transport was soon replaced
by Gen. J. Soriano Morgan who personally chose Jorge
Acosta, a retired Army officer as General Manager.
Acosta appointed new men to the positions of manager of
stores and supplies, manager of finances, and manager of
industrial relations. Although the Central and Southern
Railways kept their number of railway officials, the gener-
al management of ENAFER increased its staff from around
30 people during the pre-1968 era to around 300 people.
The new groups wrote memos to each other, asked for re-
ports, and kept themselves busy, but had nothing to do
with the railways. They interfered with the operational
units in their thirst for reports and charts.
The new bureaucrats occupied the highest positions
with the better salaries. The authority of the officials
diminished continuously.The power of the trade unions
undermined discipline and the very strict and very rigid
and unoperative norms of control of the Peruvian State led
to a total frustration of railway officers many of whom
left the organization and went to work in the private
sector, international agencies or universities.
The policies that the government took in order to
stabilize the country were quite orthodox: reduce demand.
These policies hit the low income sector of the population
particularly hard.
Scott Palmer states that the government was forced
to try to improve a number of economic restrictions
(in June) which adversely affected precisely those
elements of the population which had been the bene-
ficiaries of the reforms at this juncture, many such
elements were able to use their new organizational ca-
pacity to try to protect the prerogatives so recent-
ly facilitated by the government; for example, the
announcement of a general strike in August.
Domestically, however, the economic crisis continued
to place the heaviest burden on many of those who had
been favored by the Velasco phase of the revolution,
or at least thought they had. 1
People from all the country, especially the population
from squatter settlements protested against the severe
economic measures. Two general strikes, in 1977 and 1978,
practically paralized the country, giving Gen. Morales
Bermudez a clear message: it was time to go back to barracks.
Civil unrest was dealt with a stark hand, but without bru-
tality. Union leaders who promoted the strikes and had been
in prison for a week and had in addition lost their jobs,
later went back to their same jobs.
Elections were called in 1979 to elect representa-
tives to write a modern, updated Constitution. The APRA
party won by a large margin, and its leader, Victor Raul
Haya de la Torre, presided the "Asamblea Constituyente"
1Scott Palmer, p. 121-123
during one whole year. He died soon after signing the new
Constitution, leaving his party divided over the issue of
successsion. Armando Villanueva represented the left,
Andres Townsend the right wing. With not so subtle man-
oeuvring, Villanueva got hold of the position, but the
image of the party suffered.
In the May 1980 elections, architect F. Belaunde
Terry,who had not taken part in the elections for the
Constitution Assembly, was elected President of Peru,
winning by a wide margin and having absolute majority in
Congress.
Chapter IV
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Theories
Among the many theories of participation, there
are three clearly demarcated trends:
1) Participation takes place within certain boundaries.
2) Participation is seen as co-option of the workers.
3) Participation is seen as a continuum that ranges
from participation to citizen control.
Thomason is representative of the first model:
"Participation refers to a process in which two or more
parties influence each other in making certain plans,
policies and decisions. It is restricted to decisions
that have further effects on all those making the deci-
sions and on those represented by them." He calls parti-
cipation " a process in which workers share or take some
part in the decision making function of the enterprise,
and do so as a right or at least on a basis other than
accidental or quixotic."
Mandel takes a radical position:
1Thomason, George F.;Workers' Participation in Private
Enterprise Organization. in: Participation in Industry.
ed.Campbell Balfour. New Jersey, Rowman and Lettle-
field, 1973, p. 139
Participation means: associating the workers with
capital, accepting secret arrangements with capital,
permanent secret meetings, economic 'coordinating'
committees and even 'control committees' (such as
those in gas and electricity), where workers actually
control nothing at all but become corresponsible, in
the eyes of the public opinion, for the exorbitant
rates charged and for the fat profits of the monopo-
lies. 1
Arnstein advocates not only taking part in the decision
making process, but control of resources, dismissing
self-help and citizen involvement as euphemisms and
equating citizen participation to citizen power:
It is the redistribution of power that enables the
have-not citizens, presently excluded from the poli-
tical and economic processes, to be deliberately in-
cluded in the future. It is the strategy by which the
have-nots join in determining how information is
shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are
allocated, programs are operated and benefits like
contracts and patronage are parcelled out. In short,
it is the means by which they can induce significant
social reform which enables them to share in the bene-
fit of the affluent society. 2
This last definition of participation will be adopted for
the present analysis. It is therefore important to look at
it in more detail.
1 Mandel,Ernest: The Debate on Workers'Control. in: Hunnings,
Garson and Case(eds):Workers' Control, a Reader on Labor
and Social Change. New York, Vintage Books, 1973,p. 356
2Arnstein, Sherry R.:Ladder of Citizen Participation.
AIP Journal July 1969, p. 216
Arnstein defines a topology of eight levels of partici-
pation, arranging them for illustrative purposes in a
ladder pattern. Each rung corresponds to the extent of
citizen's power in determining the final product.
The bottom rungs of the ladder are:(1) Manipulation
and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of
"non-participation" that have been contrived by some
to substitute for genuine participation. Their real
objective is not to enable people to participate in
planning or donducting programs, but to enable power-
holders to "educate" and "cure" the participants.
Rungs 3 and 4 progress to levels of "tokenism" that
allow the have-nots to hear and have a voice: (3) In-
forming and (4) Consultation. When they are proffered,
citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But under these
conditions they lack the power to ensure that their
views will be heeded by the powerful. When participa-
tion is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-
through, no "muscle", hence no assurance of changing
status quo. Rung (5) Placation, is simply a higher
level tokism because the groundrules allow have-nots
to advise, but retain for the powerholders the con-
tinued right to decide. Further up the ladder arE
levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of de-
cision making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6)
Partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage
in trade-offs with traditional powerholders. At the
topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen
Control, have-not citizens obtain the majority of
decision-making seats, or full managerial power.
Obviously, the eight-rung ladder is a simplification,
but it helps to illustrate the point that so many have
missed - that there are significant gradations of
citizen participation, 1
Castells suggests pre-requisites for the development of
participation:
1Arnstein, p. 217
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Eight Rungs on a Ladder of
Citizen Participation
Citizen Control
Delegated Power
Partnership
Placation
Consultation
Iniorming
Therapy
Ivanipulation
Degrees of
Citizen Power
Degrees of Tokenism
Non
Participation
From: Ladder of Citizen Participation.
S.R. Arnstein, AIP Journal, July 1969, p. 217
a) A reformist program and realistic political
measures in the same direction
b) A nationalistic and demagogic ideology
c) Complementary repressive practices 1
These prerequisites seem particularly suited to
developing countries, where revolutinary regines attempt
change.
The model of participation espoused bu the Peru-
vian Military was rather simple: the Peruvian people would
back the Military in a process of participation that would
change the power structures of the country, in an effort
to achieve development.
Participation was supposed to take place in several areas:
- Rural participation
- Urban participation
- Participation in the industry
- Participation in state owned enterprises.
In order to explain the difference between theory
2in use and theory of action , two hypotheses can be for-
mulated:
Hypothesis I: the Military did not really want partici-
1Castells,M.:Participacidn y cambio social en la problems-
tica contempordnea . in: Pizzorno, Kaplan, Castells:
same title. Buenos Aires,Ediciones Siap-Planteos, 1975
p. 160
2
Argyris,C. and Scho5n,D.:Organizational Learning: A Theory
of Action Perspective. Addison Wesley Publ.Co., Ma. ,
1978,
pation, but wanted to control the process of change.
To espouse participation was a way to secure popular
support and neutralize opposition.
Hypothesis II: the Military wanted participation, but
when the revolution lost momentum and there were no visi-
ble reforms to be made, and th oil crisis and subsequent
economic impacts hit the country, austerity policies were
taken, real income went down and the expectations that
had been raise with participation could not be met. To
increase participation would augment false expectations,
therefore participation had to be relegated to a secon-
dary position.
Hypothesis III:People benefitted by reforms want equality
and are ready to share with low income sectors of society.
Hypothesis IV:Local industrialists would accept self-
management concept and would augment or at least maintain
their investment rate.
Hypothesis V:Workers or peasants benefitted by the re-
forms would identify themslves with their organizations,
increase their productivity and diminish the number of
strikes.
2. Actors
The main actors in the process -not necessarily in
order of importance- were:
a) The Military- They formed a government that Stepan has
classified as "inclusionary corporatism".
Schnitter denominates corporatism as:
a system of interest representation in which the con-
stituent units are organized into a limited number of
singular, compulsary, noncompetitive, hierarchically
ordered and functionally differentiate categories, re-
cognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and
granted a deliberate representative monopoly within the
respective categories in exchange for observing certain
controls of their selection of leaders and articulation
of demands and supports. 2
They attempted to "include" workers in the process
against the old order and traditional oligarchies.
The military program fulfilled all the pre-requisites for
participation already mentioned, opposing at the same time
traditional (non-industrial) foreign capital and promoting
controlled mobilization, trying to make reforms within the
existing political space.
1
Stepan, p. 154
2 Scni er Philigge C.: Still the Century of Corporatism?
in tepin, p. 6
b) Technocracy and Bureaucracy:
As more and more industries were nationalized, the
importance of the technocracy was evident: they were
needed to run the different state owned enterprises that
ranged from oil companies (Petroperu) to cinemas which
had belonged to the oligarchy (e.g. the "Cine Colon" in
downtown Lima). They were alienated from the process of
structural transformations. which was taking place in the
country and formed associations to protect themselves
against unilateral actions taken by the Military.
The local bureaucracy, represented by the staff of
the different Ministries, acquired power and vented their
frustrations on the technocracy of the state owned enter-
prises, trying to restrict their autonomy and to make
them subservient to their wishes.
c) Political Parties:
- APRA: During Velasco's regime, the APRA was
acknowledged as the opposition. Some former party members,
such as Carlos Delgado, number 2 in the SINAMOS hierarchy,
joined the revolution because it embodied the reforms that
APRA had promoted since the 1920's. The APRA played a
very important part in the writing of the 1979 Consti-
tution and was a key factor in the Morales Bermudez regime
as a catalytic agent for the transference of power to the
civilians.
- Partido Social Progresista:
Its two leaders Alberto Ruiz Eldredge and German
Tito Gutierrez were part of the COAP (Advisory Committee
to the President), were in charge of "Expreso", the offi-
cialist newspaper, and in the case of Gutierrez managed
a state owned enterprise, making full use of the power
given to them by the Military.
- Partido Democrata Cristiano:
This party, led by Hector Cornejo Chavez who was
appointed Director of the prestigious newspaper "El Co-
mercio" (with the nationalization of the press in 1974),
played a major role role advising the President and
shaping policies, the same as the Social Progresistas.
The irony of the situation was that they never got 10%
of the votes in any presidential election, but found them-
selves with power to change a country.
d) Interest Groups:
- Industrialists: They took advantage of a low foreign
exchange rate to purchase machinery that was in fact sub-
sidized by the State. When the government approved the
"Ley de Comunidad Industrial (CI), they stopped invest-
ments adding up to the problems of the Military.
- The Catholic Church t From being the protectors of the
status-quo and the landed gentry, they became "revolutio-
nary" showing their capacity for adaptation and ever pre-
sent power. The Bambardn case in the Pamplona invasion
was only a sample of the power of the Church even during
the Military regime.
e) The People:
Although they participated in the process, it was
not always in the way the Military wanted it to be. Trade
Unions used their newly acquired strength to serve their
own interests, which in many cases meant simply higher
wages. SINAMOS organized people that proved not to be
innocuous in the general strikes of 1977 and 1978, when
the population of squatter settlements such as Matazango
stoned vehicles of people who tried to ignore the strike
and wanted to work.
3. Analysis
Although the Peruvian government was apparently
committed to workers participation, there was no agree-
ment among its members about the issue : on the left of
the spectrum (26%), officers take a positive attitude
towards autonomous mass organizations. In the center (34%),
themes of functional participation, under the control of
the government officials, predominate; on the right (40%),
law and order schemes and inconditional and uncritical
support of the government and condemnation of strikes
1
North Liisa:Perspectives on Development Policy and Mass
Participation in the Peruvian Armed Forces.
York University-Smithonian Institution, 1978,p.12-13
become the central themes. There is, therefore, a difference
between the theory in use and the theory of action of the
military government, a difference whose origin can be
traced at the very top. Yet more differences can be found
examining each of the four typical areas of participation:
- Urban Participation
The government tried to get support from the in-
habitants of squatter settlements, but at the same time,
tried to induce orderly growth of the city with projects
such as Villa El Salvador. SINAMOS relocated settlers
and in doing so, antagonized them. Its personnel did not
follow through on projects it had helped to initiate,
showing its real objectives
1.- Neutralize the mobiliaztion of the low income sector.
2.- Make it possible to have the zone controlled by the
military.
3.- Hamper the spontaneous and unorderly growth of the
city.
4.- Build a wide base of government support.
5.- Articulate the neighborhood and community associ-
ations in order to prevent a relation with left-
ists and popular movements.
1Henry, Etienne:La Escena Urbana: Estado y Movimientos de
Pobladores 1968-1976. Lima: Pontificia Universidad
Catdlica del Peru, 1978, p. 118
EventuallySINAMOSis activities decreased in importance.1
Its mobilization efforts were constantly supervised and
were constrained and frequently checked or altered by the
national military government and/or by regional military
commanders. These contradictions in SINAMOS were so severe
that by 1975 it was widely accepted even by the Military
that it was a failure.
The posiibility of Urban Reorm following the
Cuban Model was abandoned, because the Government did not
want to discourage investment from the private sector.
- Rural Participation:
Almost 7.2 million hectares were affected by the
agrarian reform to benefit around 250,000 families, modi-
fying the pattern of ownership, but not the structure of
production or the allocation of labor to the land. One
quarter of the rural population has benefited from the
land reform. There was not much participation in the pro-
cess, only from the top down, but "for all intents and
purposes, the application of the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law,
has been the only action of the Revolutionary Government
of the Armed Forces which has brought about significant
1Stepan, p. 315
changes in the situation of the residents of rural Peru
since 1968,"l inspite of low profits, low productivity, un-
wise investment, weak management, and having no income
distribution, and remarks of the sort made by agricultural
government officials.2
On the whole, Andean peasants rejected the idea of
shared property3 and became an elite within the rural sec-
tor. Cooperative members of the sugar plantations in the
coastal areas rejected to have to redistribute their ear-
nings for the benefit of the poorer regions in the coun-
try.
- Industrial Participation
Of the four goals of the Law of the "Comunidades
Industriales", only the last one was officially es-
poused: to create more opportunities for workers through
participation and eventual ownership. The other three can
be constructed from the supposed benefits of self-manage-
ment and other goals of the military government.
The Peruvian government also expected a reduction in strikes
as a result of workers' participation, because the workers'
1Bourque and Scott Paler, p. 103
2Cleaves and Scurrah, p. 236
3BourqueS.C. and Warren, K.B.:Political Participation and
the Revolution.: Lessons from Rural Peru. Washington D.C.
Smithonian Institute, 1978, p. 15
interests would be represented and also because the use of
strike is costly for labor. This, however, did not happen.
The CI failed to identify the workers as co-owners of the
enterprise, and contributing to the process of mobili-
zation had an indirect impact on the increasing strike
rate by raising the workers' potential for collective
action. It also formed an elite benefitting only the mo-
dern sector industrial employees. 2
- State Owned Enterprises:
In the case of the state owned enterprises, the idea
of participation was seriously distorted. The power groups
in control paid lipservice to the trade unions and workers
in general, but antagonized the bureaucracy, perhaps be-
cause they did not want it to have a leadership role in the
transformation process that was taking place.
There is a clear example that the Military did not
want the workers to have full participation in the decision
making process at the highest level:
The Law 19538 of the creation of ENAFER mentions in
article 12 H that "two representatives of the workers of
ENAFER-PERU will be part of the Board of Directors, in
1 Stephens, p. 130
2Mc Clintock, C.: The Ambiguity of Peru's Third Way: Costs
and Benefits. Washington, D.C.: George Washington Uni-
versity-Smithonian Institution, 1978, p. 17
charge of the organization, direction and administration of
ENAFER. In reality, these two workers were never appointed,
perhaps because the trade unions , belonging to different
political affiliations (AFRA and Communist Party) could
never agree on who should represent the workers on the
Board. The Board, on the other hand, was never enthusiastic
about implementing the item concerning workers' participa-
tion.
Research needs to be done in this area, but empiri-
cal evidence would show a similar panorama in other state
owned enterprises.
The technocrats, alienated from the process, kept
their values and forcefully opposed change.
As Max Weber put its
With all the changes of masters in France since the
time of the First Empire, the power machine has re-
mained essentially the same. Such a machine makes
'revolution', in the sense of the forceful creation
of entirely new formations of authority, technically
more and more impossible, especially when the appara-
tus controls the modern means of communication (tele-
graph, etc.) and also by virtue of its internal ra-
tianolized structure. In classic fashion, France has
demonstrated how this process has substituted coup
d'dtat for 'revolution': all successful transformations
in France have amounted to coups d'stat.
iWeber, Max: Bureaucracy. in: From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology. ed. Gerth and Mills, Oxford University Press,
new York, 1981,p.230
As in the cases of squatter settlements, rural coopera-
tives and industry, mobilized workers organized strikes
as a protest against the economic measures taken by the
government showing unexpected initiative, and also
proving the government that they were not innocuous
4. Conclusions
Hypothesis I : is accepted in view of the analysis made in
the urban, rural, industrial and state owned enterprises'
cases. The Military did not want participation but wanted
to controlthe process of change. They manipulated con-
vinced that it was the best way to achieve their ob-
jectives.
Hypothesis II: is rejected because it has been proved that
only a small fraction of the Military wanted participa-
tion.
Hypothesis IIIsis rejected because the people who were be-
nefitted by the reforms did not want to share, showing
strong individualistic characteristics.
Hypothesis IViis rejected because local industrialists re-
jected the concept of self-management and withheld invest-
ment, contributing thus to the economic crisis.
Hypothesis V:is rejected because the number of strikes in-
creased and people did not identify with their organi-
zations.
The consequences of the actions taken by the mili-
tary government are varied: on the positive side they
include a land reform, the creation of state enterprises,
the renegotiation of terms for further foreign investment
and the emergence of a strong state from a previously dis-
articulated public sector.
On the other hand, the twist given to the partici-
patory process by the Military, reducing it to manipula-
tion, the use of demagogy to raise false expectations, and
the repression that followed when it was clear that those
expectations could not be met because the country was in
a deep crisis, have seriously damaged the concept of citi-
zens' participation.
The urban disorders and unruly behavior of the
population of squatter settlements is a consequence of
mobilization attempts, capitalized by radical groups.
The guerilla launched by "Sendero Luminoso" in the
Department of Ayacucho can be traced to the inability
of the Military government to solve the problem of rural
poverty and to benefit more families in the process of
agrarian reform. Moreover, the demagogic pretense that all
peasants were to become landowners, was clearly absurd
from the start.
The conflicting goals of the CI have been the cause
of inefficiency, low standards and less local investment,
and the case of State owned enterprises and their constant
power struggles that have little to do with any partici-
patory process but a lot with games of power are unde-
sirable outcomes that show what not to do in a process of
change. The important question, what to do, remains to be
answered.
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